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几句话总结:
基于跨越鸿沟的科技传播周期理论
科技公司 – 成为标准，赢家通吃
Proprietary & Open protocol
Gorilla / Chimp / Monkey vs. King / Prince / Serf
Enabling tech vs. App Gorilla 能级差异
Gorilla game – VC perspective – 避免Tech-risk (can it work) & Mkt risk (will ppl buy it) – 只take financial risk (profitable or not) & ppl risk (are these the people who can build it) – By only buying proven tech in hypergrowth mkt
Economic value added theory – 公司额外价值作为DCF时间序列中的抛物线
hypergrowth抢占市场时 sale比earning更重要, price/sales比price/earning更重要
尚未完全跨越鸿沟的科技市场，价值链一定有什么问题
投资者 – when will last remaining constraint be removed & by whom?
阻止tornado的是复杂度
Intro
Tech Adoption Life Cycle
Gorilla Game Investor
Mid stock picking / mid tech sector knowledge
Chap 1
例子: 1998年微软市值高
High Tech
Discontinuous Innovation
Makes outcome uncertain
Disappear vs. Niche vs. Mainstream
动力系统 – 非线性变化
旧系统一开始resist change
从不变到瞬变 – 瞬变之时为hypergrowth
旧态到新态
When hypergrowth happens
30%-40% QoQ is not untypical
需要standalone products from single vendor
新兴市场(刚进入hypergrowth的)估值/市值比成熟市场高
Essence of the Game
Finding marketing transitioning into hypergrowth
买一个gorilla candidate list
As gorilla emerge, consolidate 仓位on gorilla
Hold the gorilla for long-term
Sell gorilla when 新科技可能对其降维打击
Gorilla Game的好处
1. Lots of Upside
2. Limited Downside – 因为市场进入hypergrowth是前提
3. 容错率高 – 时间/选股不需要完美
与其他投资类型的对比
Concept investing
Earlier, whereas gorilla investing invest later & based on actual revenue
Theme investing
同: 都是identify hypergrowth mkt
异: theme investing全投, 本书只投大猩猩
与价值投资完全相反
Gorilla stock almost never undervalued
是一种growth investing
Chap 2 – 与 inside tornado + cross the chasm 相似
Tornado theory
Discontinuous innovation
买discontinuous innovation者需要infra也up & running, e.g. car w\o highway
Tech Adoption Cycle
Tech enthusiasts -> visionary -> pragmatist -> conservatives -> skeptics
大猩猩投资者 – 看visionary, 等pragmatist 站位脚跟，好股在conservatives时亦能升值
早期市场
e.g. 当时的EComm – 有网上买书/CD, 但未主流化
Key Characteristic
大Deal / 大手笔买入新科技
公司用此科技作为edge, 所以一家vendor往往没有competitor as customer
有大量偏服务的consulting firm帮企业应用此新科技，相比之下，tornado阶段，服务型的consulting service会大减少 – 而是更低价/标准化
The chasm – 特别艰难的一段时间
visionary 和pragmatist中间的gap
高不从低不就
visionary猜测可能edge小，易抄袭 – start to lose interest
pragmatist还在观望
vendor的竞争对手开始诋毁
逆水行舟，不进则死
大猩猩投资者避免Chasm风险
Bowling Valley – market penetration
顾客往往是departments with broken / mission-critical business process, 有痛点
例子: Customer Support Software Mkt
1990s 寻找痛点进入Bowling Valley
此类客户需要end-to-end solution
新价值链产生意义重大 – 大猩猩投资者真正关注的
Not yet mass market, only growth not yet hypergrowth
在bowling valley, growth is niche by niche, 但未mass market
有些市场always niche but never mass-market
此类的end-game好的利润空间但没有大猩猩级的估值
The tornado – hypergrowth
Pragmatist adopt en masse (herd dynamics)
会出现一个大猩猩，什么导致一个大猩猩
不是因为竞争优势而是因为市场渴望被标准化
例子：作为行业标准的数据库
大概3-5年
Main Street
Market Attention shift towards 微调
这意味着市场重心从内部因素price/performance 变成外部因素 – 用户界面/用户满意
no longer focus on获取新客户，而是维系旧客户
from market share to margin share
股价会跌，现在股价include / expect future hypergrowth
但大猩猩投资者跌了不应该慌，应该hold & 加仓
所有相关产品都得服务大猩猩创造的行业标准
微调的标准干死竞争对手 (Windows to Netscape on Browser)
后期主导的权力结构是tornado-phase形成的
Inertia – cost of switching
your gain/loss customers in tornado for life
Only company whose mkt share increases is the gorilla
Product EOL – 当取代的产品开始tornado
Substitution threat per Michael Porter (Competitive Advantage)
最后期 – 服务(维护此科技)外包化, use a hassle-free service instead of maintaining it in-house
Product lead to Service lead
Chap 3 Gorilla Power
Competitive Advantage – Michael Porter
Value Chain – 权力结构
e.g. IBM – compatible
Get more customer: market leader effect
头部 – more press coverage, better shelf space, shorter sales cycle
更多的合作机会
pragmatic customer 对不用行业标准很紧张
Keep more customer – barrier to entry (keep competitor out) + switching cost (keep customer in)
Drive costs down
大猩猩把价值链中低成本高价值的留给自己，垃圾的留给别人
outsource the low value work
Keep Profit Up
Proprietary Open Architecture with high switching costs
借鉴于computer wars
Proprietary: 一个公司有完全控制 (相反则是commitee)
Open: interface公开
标准一旦制定改变难 – e.g. 开车左行 vs. 右行
Hypergrowth market 中需要让增长无瓶颈，故proprietary+open
Proprietary优势在于可变的快+coherent
Open则vendor可以dev product in parallel
Committee controlled令消费者可以pick best of breed, 但变化步伐慢
大猩猩如msft可以drive others profit margin down while their own go up
Proprietary 与switching cost交织的四象限
1. Non Proprietary but high switching cost
Easy to keep customers but no edge acquire new ones
Stable / long-lived / modest premium over commoditized margin / lower bucket valuation than gorillas
2. Proprietary but low switching cost
Example: Browser – Netscape
Easy to try, but without long-term commitment
Good margin if product is best in class, but need to keep innovating, otherwise stock will dive down
不稳没有护城河
3. Non-proprietary & low-switching cost
Pure commodity marketplace where execution rules
Low margin
Gorilla vs. Chimp vs. Monkey
Monkey = 100%复刻gorilla at discount
Live & Die purely on execution
If gorilla change rules, Monkey must change theirs as well
Monkey没有护城河， market share is illusion, 大猩猩可随时获取其市场份额
Attractive for short-term opportunistic investor but not long-term B&H
Chimp = who tried to pick gorilla but don’t get picked, proprietary architecture, not compatible with gorillas
与Monkey相反的问题，难获客容易留客
Chimp只有两条路可选
1. 打大猩猩 – 太难了
2. niche化成为local大猩猩
Chimp的难处 – 新顾客join gorilla故市场份额随时间衰退
Chimp苹果与微软的PC之战
Gorilla-less tornado (King / Prince / Serf)
Mass market with non-proprietary standards
King vs. Prince vs. Serf
King是market-leader但无architecture control故没有一日得闲
Prince 10-15%市场份额
在没有架构护城河的世界, prince也有upside
没架构 – prince可相互merge – 没有互斥的prop architecture
Serf <= 1% market share
Commodity mkt
例子 – screen save 等不能吸引巨头竞争的
在下一代软件很可能巨头自有此功能
最好情况卖给巨头，最坏情况从头再来
King’s power isn’t as persistent/dramatic as gorillas
非proprietary 系统king/prince/serf – 价格战压力
Industry Position
Layers – Electricity / Semiconductor / Hardware / System Software / App Software
Enabling Technology (Non-App software) vs. Application software
Enabling Tech的大猩猩更有power
Enabling tech的市场份额集中于gorilla
App software的chimp不怕大猩猩
而enabling tech的大猩猩极强
Enabling tech随时间越来越多 – 如database etc.
Enabling tech有industry power, consumer application有consumer power
Consumer power在tornado之前有用，因为Consumer app可以吸引客户，而后期客户涌入，则巨头(enabling tech)收益(infra收益)
Competition among layers
例子 – mainframe computer市场
例子 – mini computer 市场
sys software主导，Oracle port its software onto every hardware
又如unix
例子 – 网络市场 – networking hardware
随着email “killer app” 嫌弃多个风暴
例子 – 个人电脑 – 微软OS的enabling tech稳居霸主之位，intel作为半导体的enabling layer也有很大的话语权，而app layer, 微软而造office suite 整合一些功能
Competition between gorillas
Gorilla in local market needs
1. Scalability, 2. barrier to entry
Mere scalable market likely touch other gorilla’s turf, harder to keep other companies out
Higher barrier to entry, usually more complex & harder to scale
Trade-off between scalability vs. barrier to entry
Barrier to entry are for short term, scalability safe for long term
Scalability的蛊王之路与barrier to entry的偏安江南
When Gorilla fight
1. 一个submerge/输了 – redefined as chimp 导致股价崩盘
2. 持久僵局
severe price erosion, 股价上限下降
3. 赢了则股价大胜
Intel的大猩猩力
ultra-high switching cost
IBM 选择intel是关键节点
early 1980s
之后msft OS specifically written for intel chip
Intel延续大猩猩力
scheduling of tornados
1. 奔腾等处理器一代又一代
2. 加功能, e.g. floating points, some graphical processor, 减少竞争对手的力
3. motherboard制造
AMD是monkey
同比1990-1996
Intel 12x while AMD 2x
Gorilla被技术革命
Lotus 1-2-3曾是spreadsheet的大猩猩然而被excel技术革命
大猩猩如何防御技术革命 (竞争对手10x强) – e.g. Intel CISC vs. RISC
1. 散步谣言 – FUD
2. 抄别人的RISC(优秀的)feature并整合进下一产品
如果gorilla能在被完全干掉之前generate一个新技术的gorilla alternative, 则可能就被挽救
网景浏览器 vs. Msft
用户第一个看的就是网景浏览器，对msft产生威胁
gorilla治未病 – guard against a standard that doesn’t exist yet
市场不希望gorilla被干掉because it’s too important in the haystack
Chap 4 – 大猩猩的股价估值
大猩猩look like hot company in hot category, 但作者认为市场还是undervalue这个的
discounted cashflow/NPV
VC担忧四种风险
tech risk – can it work?
mkt risk – will ppl buy it?
financial risk – profitable?
ppl risk – are these the people who can do it?
Gorilla game investor避免前两中风险
only buy proven tech in hypergrowth mkt
对于一个公司 – 当市场都不看好其股票的时候，不能得到funding – 只能最多得到估值大幅缩水的
所以衰败之时更不能投入激进的discontinuous innovation, 无钱/时间to make it happen (弱者越弱)
每个公司的估值(DCF)取决于一个return / time (抛物线形状的线下的面积)
大猩猩公司和一般公司相比 – 面积更大，几个因素
抛物线高度更高
与一般公司的抛物线高度差源自于Competitive advantage gap – 原因
1. inside tornado – 速度快
2. market leader – pragmatist buyer more likely choose it
3. set standards & attract partners & extract more value from value chain
抛物线宽度更宽 – competitive advantage period
一般公司的competitive advantage hard to sustain 因为competition
而gorilla advantage更持久 – 原因
1. initial hypergrowth 3-5 years，而之后main street adoption更久
2. 在此浪潮中, gorilla power随时间增长强者越强，非gorilla处境越发艰难
3. 价值链上的共生关系使得其他公司维护gorilla 生存
Economic value added理论(EVA)
有几个return等级
zero return / bond return / loan return / risk adj return
用EVA解释传统现象
1. rates go down – risk-adj return go down
econ value added go up – 基准线下降公司额外值/股价上升
this assumes interest rate on loan go down will cause risk-adj return also go down
2. taxes go up, ret go down
3. Better execution (tactics)
Higher height but not increased width because sustainability isn’t increased
Hypergrowth market 中抢占市场重要，此时price/sales比price/earning更重要
e.g. 抢占电脑市场dell 7.6x price/sales while others about 1x price/sales
例子 – Cisco gorilla 19x P/S, Cisco作为data switch的gorilla与ascent/lucent作为voice-switch的gorilla, 为何市场更看好cisco
4. Improved Sustainability
1996-1997 IBM mainframe computer因为network computing进展而认为mainframe useful life会增加.
5. Inside tornado
(a) higher, (b) wider, (c) lower cost of capital (lower risk-adj return)
Category Valuation -> Company Valuation
Gorilla: 最高最宽, 与category valuation同寿
Chimp: 高度有限长度有限
Chimp 能起事因为有innovation而gorilla能防守因为能抄chimp / 用standard阻止chimp的创新星火燎原
Chimp会有增长速度高于gorilla的时刻然而盈不可久
Torando中市场对于gorilla的认知也在修正
6. End of tornado
在公司营收低于预期时，宽度和高度都减少
在公司营收高于预期时，只有高度增加而宽度不变
因为management往往用将来来填补earning预期(幕后尽力不让earning低于预期 – doing everything they can) – 所以当earning真的无预兆落空时往往意味公司有大问题
End of tornado时，Gorilla晋级main street而chimp不行 – 需要把chimp股票卖掉
7. Death of gorilla
新的discontinuous innovation干掉gorilla
宽度有终点
Risk Adj Return上升
因为不再是gorilla – risk基准线上升了
传播顺序 – 墙倒众人推
1. industry partner
2. financial community
3. 顾客 – switching cost -> denial circle
Chap 5 科技股地形图
Vertical market system (垂直领域)
local gorilla, specialized, high barrier to entry
stable market-cap, low volatility
上限有限
Semiconductors
Part of gorilla game, high switching cost
Services
No gorilla in this sector (Gorilla need proprietary system with high switching cost)
Professional services
Complexity means harder to scale up
Attn to detail / custom solutions / domain expertise
Scarce resource, cannot hypergrowth
Has intellectual property, but no switching cost (high turnover in consulting relationships)
Professional service 必须稳住不流失顾客，而gorilla 哪怕abuse顾客也不担心
Distribution services
Resell products to increase mkt exposure
在tornado期间, value chain 需要这个
Commoditized / low margin / differentiate on execution
Transaction services
recurrent subscription
Phone / Fedex / Airline
作者对当时互联网科技股高度不确定 (uncharted water)
Info services & entertainment programming
no proprietary archi & low switching cost
competitive advantage period (width) determined by popularity of brand
Info service
e.g. WSJ / CNN / bloomberg
Some switching cost: habit/familiarity with tools, but not comparable with tech switching cost
Computer Services
分类
(a) global & enterprise, (b) campus/departmental/work group, (c) personal/consumer
当时随着Client/server架构兴起，这三个分类开始模糊了
Chap 6 – Search of Hypergrowth Mkts
市场price-in 一个高科技tornado是需要时间的
Tornado watch
有大量的False-positive product – which cannot cross the chasm
Tornado发生iff新的价值链
价值链的组成
Product Provider – tech + product + systems
Service Provider
Integrate multi product into system, sell it, onboard user
Not gorilla, but key to gorilla game
Customer
in 2B – tech-buyer + find user + Econ buyer
Econ buyer – boss who sees the ROI
in 2C – mostly one-person
or end user is child while econ buyer is parent
In Emerging Mkt, value chain 可能有瓶颈价值没有完全传导到顾客
尚未完全跨越鸿沟的科技市场，价值链一定有什么问题
投资者 – when will last remaining constraint be removed & by whom?
价值链最后瓶颈的移除
例子 – 早期PC, 三个瓶颈(1980s)
1. 人们都在等IBM入场
2. 缺少killer app – 没有out of box价值
3. 大商场(Macys etc.)都在观望
IBM是最后瓶颈，IBM一入场万物勃发
例子 – 互联网 – 比如email/chatroom, 限制条件 –
1. Proprietary Products (Msft etc.), 没有统一标准(每人多个email)
2. Product Fragmented – 销售渠道分散小市场，卖家(中间商)需要多个备货 – 不好
3. 线上支付未经测试 – 用户不敢买
互联网成为同时解决这三个瓶颈的关键
1. 互联网(http)称为标准
2. 线上商店
3. 内容免费+广告
网景IPO成神，browser + web server
微软承认网景gorilla
微软windows + 浏览器干掉网景
When gorillas collide
阻止tornado的是复杂度
1. 顾客觉得难用 – 需要killer app
新的app越让顾客不陌生 – less discontinuous – 越好用
2. 制造复杂度 – hard to scale up consistently
give up high-end features to be mass-produced
New Tornado: continuity + discontinuity
Continuity for customer experience
Discontinuity at Suppliers Side (权力革命)
例子 – 亚马逊买书
Chap 7 买卖大猩猩股票
When
Rule-1 Application software – buy in bowling valley
App software less cut-throat, can have (differentiated) multiple winners – 因为有顾客数据/粘性且不同
买的最好时机是没有不跨越鸿沟的时机
三种潜在outcome
1. Bowling valley forever (CAD / Proj Mgmt / etc.) -> don’t hold
2. Mass Mkt (e.g. email / financial packages) -> follow the rules here
3. Super-category merge (word-processing / spreadsheets -> office automation)
是substitution threat 还是mkt expansion (主动 vs. 被动)
Rule-2 Enabling tech soft/hardware -> more cut-throat
顾客只要App好用不在意下面的plumbing如何
可能大力开发结果无人用(huge R&D)
但enabling tech产生财富(变成大猩猩)的力量无人能及
买入时机很重要
not “which” but “when” 以减少downside risk
在enabling tech中，在chimps股价受挫之前exit
biggest downside risk是enabling tech不开始tornado – 所以避免pre-tornado play
对于software app公司，有一个vertical不买此软件比买此软件更有风险
有defensible客户关系是有high switching cost
tornado开始信号 – trade magazine不再质疑新科技的readiness而是追寻emerging mkt leader
What
Rule-3 买什么
2-4个gorilla candidate – because hard to predict
enabling tech有更多的power concentration – 有”宗教战争”
所以有更多的false-positive (显得PR上自己赢了)
Partner port product to the infra (e.g. 在微软平台上写/port一个app)
避免false-positive – 只看”第二代product在infra”(第一代可能只是表面功夫)
与总统选举相似
在tornado中, significant upside & limited downside
哪怕是chimp, 在tornado中也难以股价下降
Microprocessor例子
三个gorilla candidate (1983)
1985年PC跨越鸿沟
这是enabling tech, 最早可以1985年买
1985年第一波adoption是financial manager用spreadsheet (Lotus 1-2-3)之后更有word processor等浪潮
哪怕晚两年 (end of 1986) return依旧很大
Local area network例子
中型公司需要局域网分享word/spreadsheet/打印 etc.
Gorilla : Novell
Hold什么&Hold多久
Gorilla – hold, 特别是能extend tornado的gorilla如msft
Rule-4 hold gorilla stock long-term, sell only when substitution threat
Chimps
For application software – hold as long as they have potential for expansion (而不是被固化 / 坐以待毙)
For enabling tech – do not hold
Kings & Princes
No Proprietary architecture to increase switching costs
Advantage based on execution / econ of scale
Prince can dethrone king, chimps cannot dethrone gorilla
Gorilla game中proprietary control的战争可能要很久才能见分晓
Rule 6 – hold kings & princes lightly, 更aggressive的卖, when stock stumble / hypergrowth减速
何时卖
Rule-7 如确定某股不是gorilla之后，立刻卖
大猩猩投资 – 先分散(多股)在确定gorilla之后，再集中(特别是enabling tech)
在application software中则是可以hold稍久一点
例子 – PeopleSoft是ERP的chimp但是是human resources的领头羊
Rule-8 money taken out of non-gorilla stocks should immediately be reinvested in the remaining gorilla candidates
Rule-9 在gorilla collision中静观其变直到结果确定
信息流的筛选
若非关于tornado则无视 – e.g. 利率下降etc.
若是tornado则避免陷入hype / false tornado
新的完整产业链
niche mkt as indicator of tornado (先头阵地) – know everything about it
“Killer app” as key indicator
由third party partner得知gorilla dynamics(谁可能是真的gorilla)
Proprietary architectural control? Switching cost & barrier to entry? 有substitution threat吗?
Rule-10: 无视与gorilla game无关的大部分信息流
Chap 8 – Oracle与relationship database的tornado
数据库之前 – 多个copy的value在disk, update时会dirty / inconsistent
一开始数据库慢成为OLTP的瓶颈， IBM用hierarchical DB解决速度问题但牺牲flexibility, in query/reporting
OLTP要看reporting / query flexibility在有一些product出现后(这些product都要shallow copy of data, 每晚需要unload + transfer)
Relational DB进入视野，一开始速度很慢无法正式商用但后来速度变快了
Competed against other “4th gen languages” but oracle gained huge boost when standardized on IBM’s SQL language (created standard for industry)
巨头IBM对relational DB无兴趣
Oracle focus on portability – 每一个平台都能用
Informix focus on Unix市场
Relational technology inc (Ingres)与oracle生态位相同每年增长50% – 而oracle年增长100%
Corp America以oracle为标准使得ingres疲于应对
以Computerworld为company visibility的杂志例子 – oracle出境15-25次，领两公司2-5次
Gorilla出境更多因为
更多third party relationship
更多customer story
更多业界总结会提到gorilla
更多的钱用于PR
有非常远的substitution threat, object-oriented database是pre-chasm
1990 oracle第一次亏钱，股价-30%, 无substitution threat, 无强竞争对手，内部管理问题而非外部市场问题
Client/Server computing (也是tornado), 1992
前置条件
1. windows图形client取代dos
2. unix占领server
3. unix带来tcp/ip标准化互联网协议
4. 1992年client/server plays开始出现
在这场风暴中投资什么
client-side -> MSFT
applications : PeopleSoft & Oracle
Server hardware -> HP
Relational DB : oracle
此时一匹黑马sybase后来居上, relationalDB specific to client / server architecture , 增长率最快
Sybase在computer world在1994年开始负面消息出现 – 与partner合作受阻
Sybase缺乏orw level locking不能support transaction response time req. of very large installation (是这场比拼的关键指标)
而为什么application都用row-level locking, 因为gorilla Oracle的一个关键feature (技术标准的垄断，制造路径依赖)
Oracle vs. Msft in DB
Case总结 – 两场tornado，第一个是minicomputer,第二个是client-server computing, oracle赢了第一场，连打第二场
两场tornado之间的downturn在此是好的买入时机
Chap 9 Cisco & Networking HW tornado
Cisco在1990s经历四场tornado
1. Router
2. Intelligent Hubs
3. LAN switches
4. Remote Access Devices
历史 – email使得互联网需求急速增大(本来主要是局域网)
From LAN to WAN and beyond
Cisco五年内占市场盈利以15%到50%
历史 – 一开始stanford business school和engineer school不能互发email, 发明router
Scale up Internet的历史背景
虽然computer用unix + TCP/IP但有interoperability issue是maintainence nightmare
Cisco解决此问题，早期不需强力营销，顾客tech enthusiast /visionary, 顾客反过来找cisco
Boeing是Cisco第一个企业大客户
Cisco开始有好的word of mouth并有好的可support demand corp client的声誉
Cisco 1990年上市，MktCap三亿美金，七年之后100x
1990年三月, Cisco Router市场份额85%
作者认为市场份额悬殊往往有prop archi control with high switching cost
Cisco Router只能与Cisco Router talk不能与别的talk
Paul Johnson认为YoY增长100%且QoQ加速则tornado开始了，而且加速说明其不是短期的昙花一现
Gorilla Game频率是quarterly report
临近市场 – Intelligent systems
网络topology问题
Intelligent Hub使网络全连接提高网络系统稳定性
Synoptics是pioneer
Router与Intelligent Hub是共同增长的关系
Intelligent Hub市场参与者份额相似，更像royalty game – Hub的interface是ethernet protocol, not by device maker (interoperability)
因为公司往往先选Hub再选Router, 所以Cisco与Hub厂家建立关系某种意义上捆绑销售
第三个tornado – LAN switch
Driving Force – 需要更多的带宽且现有设备不行
high volume traffic – 点对点通信，故名为switch (phone switch)
市场发现把Hub去掉switch的能力更强
从共存关系到取而代之 – 一开始有一定的switching cost
Cisco在Sept/1993买下LAN switch的crescendo communications入场(不是最大的但是是桥头堡)，在tornado开始时，cisco是唯一次行业的上市公司
Cisco十倍revenue买入(贵)
用自己的高股价作为并购筹码是Cisco开始用的
Cisco再次收购有40%的市场份额(King not gorilla)
第四个tornado – remote access devices
modem 久而有之， 有standard所以一直是royalty game not gorilla game
痛点 – 每个能用modem上网的公司有一个大房间都是互联的线 – 大概是要联各公司的modem
变革 – remote access concentrator
Simplified network mgmt
此市场royalty game, 没有prop archi control
Tornado之前即可能是大猩猩游戏亦可是royalty game, 是市场参与者决定(基于自身利益)到底是否是proprietary play
Chap 10 CRM software
Application Software Gorillas less fearsome
五波计算机浪潮
第一波 – mainframe – 大公司的accounting & finance 的automation为主，后扩散至order entry, manufacture etc.
第二波 – minicomputer – word processing – mainframe app的小型化
第三波 – PC – application标准化/普及化
第四波 – client-server computing
monolithic -> building blocks
第五波 – internet architecture
新architecture出现，往往最初surge是新体系下跑旧App
不是自上而下的产生任务，而是自下而上的市场vendor涌现
SAP : ERP (enterprise resource planning) 领域的gorilla
Enterprise app可分为back-office / front-office/supply chain
Back office: finance, HR
Front office
软件公司的customer support有巨大的需求
1997时三个gorilla candidate 平分天下
Vantive / Scopus / Clarify
Sales Force Automation与Customer Support System开始重合
Sales Force Automation
两种类型
1. Field sales focus on consultative sale (big ticket)
2. Call Center Force
第一代sales force automation主要是field sales
不理想结果 – 原因 – 技术不成熟，许多成功销售员抵制structured process
一些Pivot制药厂sales的SFA公司，专注一个特定的sales cycle, 做的不错.
Huge amount of technical info on laptop during sales call 是一个加分项
因为供应链的just in time 方法兴起 & 公司有时在tornado内需要sales 更好的精准预测需求.
Telesales – 化customer service call为sales call (cross-sell & upsell)
Chap 11 – Tools & Processes
六部方法论 – SHARES
Scan->Hypothesize->Analyze->Respond->Evaluate->Strengthen
Scan – 将事实分为三类
Confirmation / Exception / Irrelevant
最有价值的是exception , 新的事实/观点从此创造(being wrong & learn)
Confirmation 价值不大 – being right again vs. being right first time
Build investment system
Being wrong in conventional wisdom / self error (discovery + fix)
比herd更快
Irrelevancy 对gorilla investor一大堆
Gorilla game investor 无视小的垂直领域才能用的产品，也无视service provider – 也无视well established product in main street (e.g. printer)
Only focus on at/nearing hypergrowth
Hypothesizing
Onset of tornados
Where, what product category
Constant influx of new tornados with high false-positive rate, the task is to narrow down
Tornado建模过程 – 通过value chain预想有哪些product category, 新的category处于真空更易于新的gorilla 崛起.
对value chain质疑 – 其要解决哪些问题才能Likely
需要narrow down to a product category, 并有plausible value chain at each link
Analyzing – 三问 – within the value chain
1. What product category, might support prop architecture with high switching costs.
2. 哪些公司 in that category
3. Hierarchy forming yet
Value chain 默认是royalty 因为公司都防止别人变成gorilla
往往一开始gorilla vs. royalty game是未定的，只能gorilla game是否有可能产生
信息源 – 网站查询，IPO为机会了解
IPO – 很多时候这些公司的市场还未tornado
Responding
行动起来 – 买股票
每股每年买四次，之基于Q-earning, 避免情绪化
以MktShare和diversification决定此市场的portfolio权重
Evaluating
每年四个decision, slow game, don’t micro-manage
Ongoing eval for 以下指标/问题
A. 是否依旧mkt hypergrowth – Q/Q or Y/Y growth
B. Shifts in Power? (Mkt Share / Earning / Growth)
C. Total Mkt Cap of Category
Strengthening
Diversity into multiple hypergrowth + concentrate into gorilla
对于enabling tech, selling chimp是time-sensitive的
Chap 12 – 互联网
当时互联网泡沫，作者认为行业估值会升高，但个股估值过高(overpriced), 因为Supply/demand 没有足够的股票种类来满足市场需求
Option model – 比如Yahoo过几个月换一个商业模式，有Yahoo股票是有一个option, 这种商业模式的option有一定溢价
在tornado下的科技股通过network effect强者越强，gorilla 估值极高而chimp / monkey极低.
当时internet是gorilla还是king是不清晰的
几种商业模式
Exchange型 – priceline 旅行中间商
品牌
portal (门户网站)
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